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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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21 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Intelligence Estimates Based on Critical Information
in "Crisis Situations."

1. Reference is made to:

- a. National Security Act of 1947.
- b. NSCID No. 1.
- c. DCID No. 1/1 and No. 3/1.
- d. NSC 50.

subject: "Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for
Intelligence."

f. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, for the Secretaries of
Army, Navy and Air, dated 27 April 1949 on the subject of prompt dissemi-
nation of intelligence information.

g. Memorandum, Director of Central Intelligence, dated
26 September 1949, subject "Watch Committee."

2. Study of the referenced documents indicates that it is the in-
tent of the Congress and the National Security Council that the Director
of Central Intelligence be responsible for the evaluation and dissemina-
tion of coordinated national "crisis situation" estimates. It is also
noted that the Intelligence Advisory Committee, likewise, has a re-
sponsibility with respect to such estimates, namely: review and an
expression of approval or of differing opinions in each case.

3. This matter was discussed "off the record" at the Intelligence
Advisory Committee meeting on 2 February 1949 and the above principles
were accepted in rather vague and general terms. However, there is no
record of the discussion in the hands of the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee members and, in addition, the membership of the Committee has
changed considerably since the date of the meeting.

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TOP SECRET

4. The recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence that the personnel in the intelligence agencies, who review Check List indications of imminent hostilities, informally and on their own initiative confer with one another is a step in the right direction, but the group has no clearly defined responsibilities for either crisis estimates or the critical intelligence on which the estimates would be based.

5. In connection with crisis estimates, considerable doubt exists, at least in the Department of the Army, as to whether there is a clear understanding by all concerned of the responsibilities and procedures which are implied in the several referenced documents above, all of which are subject to interpretation. Since this is a highly important problem of interest to officials outside of the Intelligence Advisory Committee there appears to be a positive need for the National Security Council to amend the appropriate existing directive to clarify the respective responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

6. Accordingly, it is recommended that the attached proposed amendment to NSCID No. 1 be circulated to the other members of the Committee for their consideration and, if they concur, that it be forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council for consideration by the Council.

/s/ M. A. Devine, Jr.

M. A. DEVINE, JR.
Colonel, G.S.C.
Actg Director of Intelligence

1 Incl
Proposed Amendment

TOP SECRET